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Abstract—Artificial intelligence (AI) is once again a topic of
huge interest for computer scientists around the world. Whilst
advances in the capability of machines are being made all around
the world at an incredible rate, there is also increasing focus
on the need for computerised systems to be able to explain
their decisions, at least to some degree. It is also clear that
data and knowledge in the real world are characterised by
uncertainty. Fuzzy systems can provide decision support, which
both handle uncertainty and have explicit representations of
uncertain knowledge and inference processes. However, it is not
yet clear how any decision support systems, including those
featuring fuzzy methods, should be evaluated as to whether their
use is permitted. This paper presents a conceptual framework
of indistinguishability as the key component of the evaluation
of computerised decision support systems. Case studies are
presented in which it has been clearly demonstrated that human
expert performance is less than perfect, together with techniques
that may enable fuzzy systems to emulate human-level perfor-
mance including variability. In conclusion, this paper argues for
the need for ‘fuzzy AI’ in two senses: (i) the need for fuzzy
methodologies (in the technical sense of Zadeh’s fuzzy sets and
systems) as knowledge-based systems to represent and reason
with uncertainty; and (ii) the need for fuzziness (in the non-
technical sense) with an acceptance of imperfect performance in
evaluating AI systems.
Index Terms—Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Inference Systems, Human
Reasoning, Approximate Reasoning, Artificial Intelligence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following several peaks and troughs, Artificial Intelligence
(AI) is once again at the forefront of Computer Science
research around the world. Perhaps the first clear demonstra-
tion of super-human machine intelligence (that is, machine
intelligence that can outperform the best human performance)
was in 1997 when IBM’s Deep Blue chess-playing computer
challenged Gary Kasparov (the reigning world chess champion
and possessing the highest official ranking score at the time)
to a chess match under regular tournament style rules. Deep
Blue emerged victorious, beating Kasparov by 3½–2½ over
a closely fought six game match. Whilst IBM have never
published full details of the algorithms employed, Deep Blue
featured a high-speed parallel implementation of an alpha-
beta search featuring a board evaluation algorithm [1]. In this
regard, the term ‘AI’ or even ‘machine intelligence’ can be
disputed as an accurate description of what is essentially a
brute-force search algorithm containing no real intelligence;
nevertheless, Deep Blue beat a human at chess (arguably, the
best in the world) in a task that requires human intelligence.
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Research into artificial neural networks has been on-going
since the 1950s, punctuated by a hiatus in the 1970s following
the publication of Minksy and Papert’s exposition on the
limitation of perceptrons in 1969 [2], followed by gradual
incremental advances on a number of fronts (algorithmic
and implementations). The recent explosion in interest in
Deep Learning probably commenced around 2010 when deep
convolutional neural nets achieved super-human performance
in a visual pattern recognition contest at the International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence [3] and demonstrated
significant improvement over other approaches on several
benchmark problems at the Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) in 2012 [4].
In 2017, twenty years on from Deep Blue, AlphaGo Master
demonstrated super-human performance by beating the best
human player in world at Go, Ke Jie, 3-0 in the Future of Go
Summit held in Wuzhen. Alpha Go Master, developed by the
Google DeepMind company, employed deep learning in the
form of convolutional neural networks combined with a Monte
Carlo tree search algorithm, trained through reinforcement
learning. Whilst in some ways Monte Carlo tree search is a
straight-forward and easily understood search algorithm, the
fact that it is heuristic and non-deterministic seems to lead
to it being more often described as an ‘AI-algorithm’. In
particular, the combination of Monte Carlo tree search and
deep learning neural networks, both of which do not feature
explicit knowledge, has meant that the AlphaGo series of
programs is often described as being AI.
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss definitions of AI
or machine intelligence; two standard dictionary definitions of
artificial intelligence are:
“computer systems able to perform tasks normally
requiring human intelligence” [OED]
“the capability of a machine to imitate intelligent
human behavior” [Merriam-Webster]
Nor is the purpose to undertake a philosophical exploration
of whether any particular computer program is viewed as
constituting AI, other than to note Turing’s observation that
when an algorithm is completely predictable, it is unlikely to
be considered to be intelligent [5]:
“The extent to which we regard something as behav-
ing in an intelligent manner is determined as much
by our own state of mind and training as by the
properties of the object under consideration. If we
are able to explain and predict its behaviour or if
there seems to be little underlying plan, we have
little temptation to imagine intelligence.” [Turing,
1948]
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currently the vogue, this paper argues for the need in specific
contexts for knowledge-based approaches to AI, with explicit
representation of and reasoning with uncertainty. As part of
this argument, the use of fuzzy techniques is advocated as one
suitable approach that can deliver the necessary capabilities.
Furthermore, it is claimed that the presence of imperfect
reasoning and imperfect performance is, and must be, an
essential feature of acceptance testing of these AI algorithms.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II
presents recent background on the need for explainable AI,
advocating the role of decision support systems. Section III
introduces the fundamental basis of and need for uncertainty
handling in decision support, while Section IV outlines how
decision support systems might be evaluated through a form of
a Turing Test. Section V and Section VI discuss how variation
in reasoning is a feature of human reasoning and thus should
be incorporated in computer expert system reasoning, if it
is to pass such evaluation tests. Section VII then presents
some current techniques that may be used, in the context
of fuzzy expert systems, to incorporate variation, and the
benefits that can be obtained by doing so. Discussion of these
potential benefits and speculation around various points that
arise are given in Section VIII. Finally, some possible future
directions of research are outlined and the main conclusions
are summarised.
II. EXPLAINABLE AI
The impressive advances in performance achieved recently
by deep learning techniques has increased the focus of atten-
tion on sub-symbolic and statistical approaches to AI. Whilst
these approaches have indeed achieved some remarkable re-
sults, they can suffer from lacking interpretability or the ability
for their decision processes to be understood or explained.
The need for explainable AI has grown in importance re-
cently, with explicit recognition through, for example, the Ex-
plainable AI (XAI) program of projects funded by DARPA [6].
This suite of research projects is mainly exploring either the
development of novel techniques to add (or enhance) the
capability of humans to understand the processing of deep
learning techniques and/or to develop “alternative machine
learning techniques that learn more structured, interpretable, or
causal models”. The program also extends to the design and
development of new explanation interfaces and in exploring
“research directly related to the problem of explaining machine
learning models to end users”.
In parallel, the European Union (EU), recently introduced its
directive on General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [7],
which includes explicit requirements for individuals “not to be
subject to a decision [...] which is based solely on automated
processing and which [...] significantly affects him or her [...]
without any human intervention”. Further, it requires that such
data processing algorithms should allow the individuals subject
to the decision “to obtain an explanation of the decision
reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision”.
Deep learning and statistical approaches have had most
success in areas such as understanding speech, handwriting
recognition, facial recognition and other visual tasks such
as generic object recognition. It is not obvious that humans
use explicit rules when performing such tasks. Consider, for
example, natural language understanding: whilst it is hard to
write complete rules of a language such as English, the vast
majority of humans have largely mastered the speaking of their
native tongue(s) by age five. Similarly, humans are capable of
complex visual processing tasks including facial and object
recognition, and 3D perception of the environment including
estimations of distance, velocity and acceleration. Again, these
abilities are acquired by most humans without any recourse to
rules or other forms of explicit knowledge representation.
Whilst it is clear that many tasks requiring intelligence can
be carried out without explicit knowledge representation and
reasoning, nevertheless, it seems equally obvious that many
tasks requiring human intelligence benefit hugely from the
explicit use of knowledge. Examples are very numerous, but
include areas such as the ‘rules of the road’ — it is more
efficient to be told that one should stop at a red-light and
proceed through a green one, rather than discover the general
principle through reinforcement learning! Indeed, the rule in
many countries is more complex, and it is far more efficient to
read the explicit rules found on the Wikipedia page ‘Turn on
red’ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turn on red) rather than
learning by example in each country visited.
A similar example might be in mathematics. Of course,
relatively simple concepts such as counting, simple addition
and even multiplication may be easy to acquire through
experience. But some more advanced concepts such as (for
example) ‘the chain rule’ (for computing the derivative of the
composition of two or more functions) or integration by parts
(finding the integral of a product of functions) is easier to
acquire by learning the rules, rather than by deriving from
first principles. Then, once the rules have been learned, it is far
more efficient to simply apply the rules in subsequent analyses.
Based on these considerations, there is a clear case for
the need for knowledge-based approaches in some contexts,
as a complementary technique to supplement sub-symbolic
approaches. Of course, it can be argued that sub-symbolic
approaches might be used in conjunction with explanatory
components which are able to ‘add’ interpretable representa-
tions of knowledge which explain how decisions were arrived
at, after the event — i.e. that decision making processes
and explanatory processes can be two completely independent
components in an AI system. This is not a contradiction,
but the important point is that knowledge can be explicitly
represented and incorporated into AI systems, and there is
sometimes benefit from doing so. Hence, it would seem
slightly perverse to deliberately not take advantage of this.
As a concluding remark, the use of knowledge-base ap-
proaches does not necessarily mean that these must be in
the form of ‘IF-THEN’ production rules that feature in ex-
pert systems. The existence of non rule-based techniques
such as decision trees or case-based reasoning confirms this
point. However, it seems unarguable that knowledge-based
approaches are useful, and that one form of knowledge-based
approach that may be used are expert systems in which some
aspects of knowledge are represented mainly as if–then rules.
3III. FUZZY SETS AND SYSTEMS
Having established the need for knowledge-based ap-
proaches and the usefulness of expert systems for AI (as
complementary to other approaches), a case will now be made
for the use of techniques based on fuzzy sets and systems
within such expert systems.
There is uncertainty present in all physical measurements
and almost all human knowledge. Of course, one can construct
items of data which have no uncertainty, such as the number of
white kings on a chess board and similar items of knowledge
(facts) such as Albert Einstein is no longer alive, but in
terms of the type of knowledge that usually features within
AI (expert) systems, uncertainty is an ever-present feature. In
physical measurements, uncertainty is present in all measuring
devices and, of course, in the fundamental properties of nature
as expressed by Heisenberg’s famous uncertainty principle [8].
The essential meaning of which is that it is not possible
to know both the position and the velocity (momentum)
of a particle at the same time, with zero uncertainty. This
fundamental uncertainty is, in practice, infinitesimally small
compared to actual uncertainties observed in any real physical
measurements, but nevertheless it emphasises the fact the
uncertainty is ever present, and is not simply an artefact.
Fuzzy sets were introduced in 1965 by Zadeh [9] specifi-
cally to deal with difficult “classes of objects encountered in
the real physical world” which are “imprecisely defined” and
yet “play an important role in human thinking”. In 1973 [10]
and then his seminal papers of 1975 [11], [12], [13] he intro-
duced the full framework of fuzzy logic, including linguistic
variables, specifically to be used “in the realm of humanistic
systems” which he defined to include AI and human decision
processes. Since their introduction, fuzzy systems have clearly
had significant impact, largely (and somewhat ironically) in
the area of control engineering, rather than human reasoning.
Whilst, as already observed, rule-based systems are just one
form of knowledge-based approaches, they have proved popu-
lar frameworks for representing and reasoning with explicit
knowledge in which there is uncertainty (imprecision) in
both data and knowledge. Nevertheless, from Mamdani’s first
papers on fuzzy control [14], [15] onwards, fuzzy rule-based
systems have been used with great effect [16], [17], [18]. The
terms ‘fuzzy inference system’ (FIS) and ‘fuzzy expert system’
have both been used as an alternative label for fuzzy rule-
based systems — i.e. fuzzy systems which feature a rule-base
in the form of fuzzy ‘IF-THEN’ production rules. Of course,
there are many forms of non-rule-based fuzzy inference such
as fuzzy neural network approaches [19], [20], but these will
not be further discussed here.
Medical decision making domains are a natural target for
FISs, due to the presence of uncertainty in data and knowledge,
combined with a high level of desirability for the need for
explanatory facilities within the system. One example of a
medical FIS is that of the Expert DataCare system [21], see
Fig. 1, which will serve as an illustrative example as follows.
The process of birth is a stressful process for both mother
and infant child; in this context ‘stressful’ is meant in the
technical medical meaning of “a physical, mental, or emotional
Fig. 1: The Expert DataCare umbilical acid-base expert system in a
clinical setting. The blood gas machine is shown on the left, Expert
DataCare implemented on a laptop in the middle, with a printer to
output the results on the right.
factor that causes bodily or mental tension” [MedicineNet].
The issue is that deprivation of oxygen (hypoxia) is part of
normal birth process, due to restriction of blood-flow through
the umbilical cord of the infant during the contractions of
labour, and that this hypoxia can develop into a condition
serious enough to cause physical harm (asphyxia), potentially
in the form of brain damage in the initial stages, but ulti-
mately leading to infant death. The term ‘perinatal asphyxia’
(asphyxia which occurs at the time of birth) is used in this
context, and is thought to affect something like 2-10 cases
per one thousand births, with death occurring in perhaps 1-5
infants per thousand.
In the 1990s, exploratory research was undertaken to cre-
ate an objective measurement-based method to diagnose the
presence and severity of perinatal asphyxia, in order to in-
form the medical staff present at the birth as to the need
for resuscitation or other active forms of medical interven-
tion. The method investigated was based on the analysis of
biophysical measurements of blood samples taken from the
artery and vein of an infant’s umbilical cord that had been
double-clamped and isolated. These measurements consisted
of variables derived from and related to the oxygen content,
carbon dioxide content and lactic acid content of the venous
blood (oxygenated blood entering the infant) and the arterial
blood (de-oxygenated blood leaving the infant). This process
is known as umbilical blood-gas analysis or umbilical acid-
base analysis. The medical principles behind this analysis
will not be described in depth, but detailed and knowledgable
assessment of umbilical acid-base measurements has been
shown to provide clinical information on the asphyxiated state
of the infant [22]. However, this assessment process is complex
and requires significant specialist expertise: it is hereafter
referred to as a decision process, in the sense that a decision
is made as to the severity of asphyxia present in the infant
based on the umbilical acid-base measurements.
Expert DataCare was created to undertake analysis of such
acid-base measurements taken from arterial and venous ves-
sels of an infant’s umbilical cord at the instant of delivery
(birth) [21]. The system was created as an expert system, based
(loosely) on rules of interpretation extracted from interviews
undertaken with world-leading experts in umbilical acid-base
analysis. Whilst the crisp version of the system was found
to perform at a level sufficient for deployment in a clinical
setting [21], nevertheless it was extended to employ fuzzy
4rules within a fuzzy inference system in an attempt to over-
come perceived limitations with interpretations falling at crisp
boundaries of decision making [23], [24]. The conversion of
the crisp system to a fuzzy system led to the identification
of an additional key challenge: how could the performance
of this ‘improved’ expert system, featuring fuzzy inference,
be properly evaluated in comparison with the existing crisp
expert system and human experts?
IV. EVALUATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
In the context of computer games, such as Deep Blue and
Alpha Go described earlier, evaluation of their performance
including (and particularly) in comparison with human experts
in the domain is obvious: simply arrange a competitive game
with selected human experts and see who wins (accepting
that there may be very significant practical issues in arranging
such a competition). But, this raises an important and critical
question in regards to computer expert systems: how should
expert systems be properly evaluated as to their level of
performance in a given domain? As a corollary, what level of
performance of a computer expert system should be considered
sufficient to allow its deployment in the real world?
A. The Turing Test
In Alan Turing’s seminal paper “Computing Machinery
and Intelligence” [25], he introduced what he termed ‘The
Imitation Game’ as a proxy test for answering the question
‘Can machines think?’. In the original version of the game
(subsequently revised by Turing) there are two subjects, a man
(A) and a woman (B). A third person, an interrogator (C) of
either sex, may ask questions of A and B in order to attempt
to identify which is the man and which is the woman. It is
part of A’s objective (the man) to cause C (the interrogator) to
make the wrong identification whilst it is part of B’s objective
(the woman) to help the interrogator. Then Turing suggests
replacing A (the man) with a computer, and proposes that
the question “Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often
when the game is played like this as he does when the game
is played between a man and a woman?” as replacing the
original question ‘Can machines think?’.
In subsequent clarifications, Turing dropped the aspect of
having a male and female (with the task being to correctly
identify gender), and instead simplified it to just being a task
of distinguishing machine from man (generally now taken to
simply mean a person of either gender). The Imitation Game
is shown in stylised form in Fig. 2; it has subsequently become
known as simply ‘The Turing Test’ for AI. The fundamental
concept underlying the Turing Test is the concept of indistin-
guishability — essentially, if a computer is indistinguishable
from a human, then it can be deemed as intelligent, at least to
the same degree as humans are. Note that, of course, Turing
emphasises that this indistinguishability is in the domain of
the conversational exchange only — i.e. physical form, for
example, is not relevant here.
Fig. 2: A stylised representation of the Turing Test (Juan Alberto
Sa´nchez Margallo [CC BY-SA 2.5]).
B. Evaluating Decision Support Systems
The answers to the questions posed in the opening paragraph
of this Section may then be as follows. A computer expert
system should be evaluated by undertaking an experiment
along similar lines to the Turing Test — that is, to pose
problems to the expert system and human expert(s) and assess
whether observer(s) can distinguish which is the computer
expert system and which is/are the human participants. If the
expert system is indistinguishable from the human experts,
then it has demonstrated sufficient expertise to be deployed,
regardless of the absolute level of performance attained.
Of course, this suggestion is not precisely equivalent to the
Turing Test. But, the Turing Test is actually relatively poorly
specified in practice. As alluded to above, Turing himself
revised and clarified the Test during his lifetime, altering from
the originally posed formulation consisting of imitating a man
as compared to a woman, to that of simply distinguishing
computer from human. He also later clarified that it should
be undertaken by a “jury” (i.e. not just a single observer)
and repeated multiple times (implying a statistical approach
to determining success or failure of imitation).
So, to make this proposal more specific. A test should be
constructed consisting of challenging problem instances in
the domain of the problem being addressed by the expert
system. Then, the problem instances are posed to both the
computer expert system and a panel of experts (to obtain
a representative characterisation of human expertise in the
domain). The answers provided by the expert system and
human experts are compared, preferably statistically. If there
is no statistical difference between the computer expert system
and the human experts, then the expert system is deemed to
exhibit sufficient level of performance to be deployed.
In this specification the phrase “challenging problem in-
stances” is used. It is sufficient to state that the level of
difficulty of the problem instances used in the test provides
an indication of the level of expertise that can be claimed
for the expert system. For example, if the system passes a
test in which only very simple mathematical problems are
posed (e.g. “what is 2 + 3?”), then the system can only be
claimed to be performing at a level of simple mathematics,
not as an expert mathematician, even if the panel of human
5experts were themselves expert mathematicians. Developing
this idea further, there may be a set (or subset) of questions
for which the human experts achieve 100% performance (i.e.
they consistently get all the answers correct); in this case the
computer expert system should achieve 100% performance on
the same set of questions. However, if a set of questions are
posed that are really challenging for the human experts, then
one might perfectly reasonably expect that the experts do not
get all questions correct, their level of performance may be
some way below 100%. In this case the expert system should
only be expected to perform at a similar level. The important
corollary here is that if the problem domain is such that human
experts cannot achieve 100% performance, then we should not
expect a computer expert system in this domain to do so, or
to put it another way if we allow human experts to make
mistakes, then we must allow a computer expert system
to do so.
V. VARIATION IN HUMAN REASONING
Not only should we allow a computer expert system to
make mistakes — as Turing puts it “if a machine is expected
to be infallible, it cannot also be intelligent” (Turing, 1947)
— but we might also quite naturally expect it to exhibit
behaviours which have some random element, or at least
as Turing puts it ‘partially random’. Whilst we all like to
think of ourselves as rational decision makers, it is clear that
humans do make mistakes. It is proposed above that the test
for computer expert system performance should be carried out
in comparison to a panel of human experts. The implication
here is that human experts may exhibit differences in opinion
— hence the need for a panel, rather than simply selecting a
single expert to participate. The phenomenon of inter-expert
variation (variation in opinion or answer between different
human experts) is well established and has been studied (and
measured) in many contexts, including in many scientific
studies and problem domains requiring expertise. Two case
studies will be described to illustrate this.
The first is one in which a computerised expert system
for the analysis of the cardiotocograph (CTG) in labour was
compared against human experts in order to determine if
it was performing at an acceptable level [26]. This study
featured a set of 17 experts from around the UK, assessed
their performance in reviewing 50 cases of infant births in
which CTG recording were made, and compared their decision
recommendations with that of a computer expert system.
The agreement between different experts (termed ‘inter-expert
agreement’ or just ‘agreement’) was calculated and found to
be around 60-75% — that is, the experts agreed with each
other around two-thirds of the time. The computer expert
system performance was indistinguishable from the experts
in terms of agreement in that its agreement with the experts
was around 68%. The decision making experiment in this
study was carried out twice, one month apart, allowing the
performance of the experts to be compared against themselves.
This found the agreement of experts with themselves (termed
‘intra-expert agreement’ or ‘consistency’) to be around 75-
90%. Interestingly, whilst the expert system was found to have
a much higher consistency than the experts at over 99%, it was
actually not 100% consistent. This was due to the fact that the
system featured a small element of operator intervention, and
was subjected to a minor difference in user-input in one case.
Precisely this form of Turing Test style evaluation was
carried out on the Expert DataCare system. In this evalua-
tion study, six experts in umbilical acid-base analysis were
recruited to take part. Fifty challenging cases of umbilical acid-
base results were selected, most of which were associated with
situations of poor outcome for the infant at birth. The experts
were asked to independently rank the fifty cases from 1 (worst
outcome) to 50 (best outcome) in terms of how severe the
lack of oxygen (birth asphyxia) was for the infant. The Expert
DataCare system was then used to assess the same results, and
its numerical output was similarly used to rank the cases [27].
The results are shown in Fig. 3(a). In this figure, the x-axis
represents the ranking position specified by Expert DataCare,
whilst the ranking position given to the same infant by each
expert is represented on the y-axis. So, for example, position 1
on the x-axis represents the infant that Expert DataCare ranked
as the worst (sickest) baby in terms of its blood-gas results (i.e.
the infant with the most severe asphyxia); at this position, a
circle is plotted on the y-axis at the ranking position given
by each of the six experts. Thus, at position 1 on the x-axis,
there are six circles superimposed at position 1 on the y-axis,
reflecting the fact that the expert system and all six experts
labelled this case as infant 1 — i.e. the sickest. At position 2
on the x-axis, there are four circles superimposed at position
2 on the y-axis, whilst there is one circle at position 4 and one
at position 8. By position x = 12, it can be seen that there are
six circles, at y = 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 16. The Spearman rank
order correlation between all six experts and Expert DataCare
is actually 0.95, which signifies very high overall agreement.
Nevertheless, it is clear there are differences of opinion in
many of the cases.
This experiment was then repeated voluntarily by two of
the six clinicians, one month after the initial experiment. The
same 50 cases were re-presented to the two clinicians, but in
a different (random) order. Of course, the two clinicians were
blinded as to their original results and each other, and once
again each independently ranked the cases. The results of this
repeat study are shown in Fig. 3(b). The figure is organised
the same as Fig. 3(a), with the x-axis still representing the
label assigned by the Expert DataCare system, but in this case
there are only two experts, each with two repeats of the study.
It can be seen that expert A and B both label infant 1 (i.e.
the infant labelled as the sickest baby by Expert DataCare)
as infant 1 both times. However, vertical separation of the
markers (triangles for expert A and circles for expert B) can
clearly be seen. For example, for infant 8, expert A labelled
it 8 and 12, whilst B labelled it 9 and 11 — i.e. there is also
clear intra-expert variation.
A further observation from Fig. 3(b) is that while there are
many cases of intra-expert variation (indeed, in around half
of the 50 cases, both experts have given different answers in
the two repeats of the task), there are a few cases of complete
agreement — case 1 is labelled as such by both experts both
times, and case 50 is labelled as 50 by both each time. It is
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Fig. 3: An illustration of inter-expert and intra-expert variability observed in the context of umbilical acid-base analysis.
perhaps reasonable to suggest that the variation observed may
be related to the difficulty of the case or problem instance
under consideration. In the specific instance of infant 1 in this
study, the infant went on to die as a result of the events of
labour, and that infant was the only one to do so. From this
perspective, it seems clear that this specific individual was
the sickest infant and thus the fact that the experts all agree,
including both times for expert A and B, is perhaps indicative
of this clarity. To put this another way, the more difficult a case
or problem is to interpret or solve, the more variation is likely
to occur.
However, as per the CTG expert system referred to earlier,
whilst in terms of overall performance and agreement with the
other experts, Expert DataCare is essentially indistinguishable,
this is not the case when it comes to consistency. A level
of variation is clearly observed in the human experts which
is characteristically different in the Expert DataCare system.
Indeed, the Expert DataCare system is entirely deterministic
in its output given a fixed set of inputs and hence it exhibits
zero variability (100% consistency) in this experiment.
VI. VARIATION IN EXPERT SYSTEM REASONING
These observations bring us back to the Turing Test for
expert system performance. An expert system, whilst perform-
ing similarly to experts, will not be indistinguishable from
experts unless it exhibits the same degree of consistency (or
variability / inconsistency) as the human experts. That is, the
expert system will fail the Turing Test because it will be
significantly and obviously more consistent than the human
experts. This point was of course recognised by Turing in his
original proposition of the test, addressing it as follows:
“the interrogator could distinguish the machine from
the man simply by setting them a number of prob-
lems in arithmetic. The machine would be unmasked
because of its deadly accuracy. The reply to this is
simple. The machine (programmed for playing the
game) would not attempt to give the right answers
to the arithmetic problems. It would deliberately
introduce mistakes in a manner calculated to confuse
the interrogator.” [Turing, 1950]
As stated in Section IV-B, “a computerised expert system
should be considered . . . for deployment in the real world if its
level of performance is indistinguishable from human experts
operating in the given domain”. This formulation does not
actually require that the expert system must possess variability
or make the same mistakes as human experts. Rather, it
requires that the level of performance of the expert system is
indistinguishable from human experts. So, if performance can
be adequately measured and demonstrated to be indistinguish-
able without having variability, then that is sufficient. However,
if a computer system can be reliably distinguished from the
human experts on any basis, then it may be hard to argue that
the performance is indistinguishable. By this argument, whilst
not essential for expert systems to emulate human variability
in order to satisfy evaluation tests of performance, it may be
of benefit if they do.
Note that a policy to “deliberately introduce mistakes” (in
Turing’s words) into computer expert systems is not advocated
here. The word ‘mistake’ clearly implies that there is an
error or incorrect decision being provided, and it is difficult
to see how this might be genuinely useful in any context
other than passing a Turing Test. Rather, as illustrated in
the two case studies of medical decision making mentioned
above [26], [27], there may be differences of opinion between
experts as to what the correct decision is, and indeed there
may be multiple alternative correct decisions. Again, this
is easy to conceptualise in the context of games such as
chess. Of course there may be an obviously wrong move,
but within a world championship game of chess, there will
be differences of opinion as to the best move to make —
put another way, there may be several obvious wrong moves,
some questionable moves, and several alternative good moves.
Differences of opinion as to which good move to make may be
reflective of different reasoning processes or may even simply
be an expression of randomness. Variation (non-determinism)
is essential in becoming world chess champion; thus, variation
in decision making is not the same as making mistakes.
VII. MODELLING AND MEASURING VARIATION
Having established that variation in decision making be-
haviour is necessary in the context of producing expert systems
that are able to pass tests of indistinguishability from human
experts, the question arises as to how variation might be
introduced and whether there is any benefit to be gained in
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Fig. 4: An illustration of a standard (type-1) fuzzy set modelling the
concept medium height.
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Fig. 5: An illustration of various opinions as to where the set medium
height might be located.
doing so. A programme of research was instigated to explore
whether the inter- and intra-expert variability observed in
Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) could be successfully modelled, thereby
measured, and whether doing so might have any impact on
the performance of the Expert DataCare system.
A. Non-Stationary Fuzzy Sets
An example standard fuzzy set to model the concept medium
height is shown in Fig. 4. Whilst, of course, the generates a
non-linear mapping between the x-axis variable (in this case
height in metres) with the membership of the set of medium
height, there is no fuzziness in this mapping. In a sense the
mapping is precise, even though the concept itself appears im-
precise in common understanding. This apparent contradiction
in the definition of standard (type-1) fuzzy sets was recognised
by Zadeh himself, and addressed through the introduction of
type-2 fuzzy sets [11], in which the membership at each value
of the domain x is given as a type-1 fuzzy set, rather than as
a precise number.
However, a conventional type-2 fuzzy set, whilst ‘blurring’
the membership function, does not explicitly represent vari-
ability in reasoning. Consider as a thought experiment asking
different individuals to independently position the set medium
height on the x-axis (actually it is straight forward to undertake
such an experiment, for example, in a classroom of students).
This invariably results in a difference of opinion as to where
the set should be located, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
A novel modification of a fuzzy set, originally named the
non-stationary fuzzy set has been proposed [28], and more
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Fig. 6: An illustration of a non-stationary fuzzy set, providing a
mechanism for modelling variation in fuzzy inferencing.
recently refined to the concept of a constrained type-2 fuzzy
set [29]. This conceptual framework provides a mechanism for
defining an underlying base or generator type-1 fuzzy set to
model a concept. Then explicit variations of that generator set
may be created to represent differences of opinion as to the
precise location of the underlying concept. This is illustrated
in Fig. 6, in which the generator set (the underlying concept)
is shown in red and its variations are shown in black.
The amount of variation allowed in each concept (type-1
set) is explicitly controlled, usually expressed as the amount
of variation in the centre point (location) of the type-1 set
represented as a percentage of the universe of discourse (the
x-axis). Fig. 6 illustrates a variation of 20%, corresponding
to left-right shift of the generator set which covers 20% of
the x-axis. Actually, this would constitute a huge variation (or
uncertainty) in the location of the set — in practice variations
of between 1% and a maximum of 10% have been explored.
B. Modelling Variation in Umbilical Acid-Base Assessment
The mechanism of non-stationary fuzzy sets was used
to model the inter- and intra-expert variation observed in
umbilical acid-base assessment, as seen in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b).
Experiments were carried out to measure the variation ob-
served in the final ordering of infants that was obtained when
the fuzzy sets in Expert DataCare had a specified amount of
variation, ranging from 1% to 10%. These experiments were
carried out in two independent trials: one to find the best
match as compared to the observed inter-expert variation, and
a second to find the best match for intra-expert variation. The
results of these experiments are shown in Fig. 7, in which
the error-bars plotted on the y-axis at each position on the x-
axis show the minimum and maximum opinion obtained from
the Expert DataCare system containing variability. The first
finding was that 3% variation in the underlying fuzzy sets of
Expert DataCare obtained variation which was the best match
for inter-expert opinion, as shown in Fig. 7(a). Somewhat
surprisingly, it was also found that the same 3% variation also
best matched intra-expert opinion, as shown in Fig. 7(b).
These experiments represent the first time that variation
incorporated into fuzzy sets has been used to model the
variation observed in human reasoning. Two primary obser-
vations may be made. Firstly, that this technique has not only
been used to model variation, but also that it has provided a
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Fig. 7: The optimal non-stationary variation to model expert variability.
quantification of variation in the observed opinions. Indeed,
a variation of 3% (in location on the x-axis) best matches
the inter-variation and the intra-variation — loosely, it might
be claimed that the amount of inter-expert variation observed
in this specific context is 3% and the intra-expert variation
is also 3%. Secondly, it is quite clear that this variation is
categorically not the same as adding random ‘mistakes’ into
the system. It can be seen that the infant labelled in position
1 (the sickest baby, as in Sec. V) is consistently labelled as
such by the system with 3% variation, whereas more variation
is observed for infants in the middle of the distribution.
In summary, the use of non-stationary fuzzy sets has allowed
the variation in human decision making to be modelled and
quantified. Further, it has demonstrated that having some
variation in the underlying fuzzy sets that constitute a system
— which essentially correspond to the underlying meaning
of terms used in the decision context — leads to interesting
patterns of variation in the end decision. Variation can
be incorporated into computer expert systems to model
human variation, but this is not random decision making.
C. Impact of Variation on Performance
Having successfully modelled and quantified variation in a
decision context, the next obvious question is to whether this
variation may be used to somehow improve decision making.
Faced with the undeniable fact that variation in opinion is
often observed between human experts, a strategy that is
commonly adopted is simply to ask the opinion of more than
one expert — the ‘jury’ as Turing called it — and to somehow
resolve the (possibly differing) views obtained into an overall
consensus opinion. Several methods have been proposed as
to reaching consensus when differing opinions are obtained.
Obvious methods might be to take the average (this requires
numeric output) or perhaps majority vote (which can be used
for categorical decisions) and many others.
A further set of experiments were carried out to explore
the impact of variation in fuzzy expert systems, using non-
stationary fuzzy sets, on the performance of such systems.
In order to do so, a different decision making context was
required in which there existed some form of target output
Fig. 8: The clinical protocol, as written, for advising patients on the
need for follow-up treatments following surgery for breast cancer, in
use in Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust.
(‘correct’ or ‘objective’ decision) against which the perfor-
mance of the fuzzy system could be compared. The decision
context chosen was in regard to selecting the appropriate form
of treatment to apply in cases of breast cancer.
If a woman is diagnosed as suffering from breast cancer,
the initial treatment is relatively straight-forward in that (in
most cases) surgery is immediately undertaken to remove the
tumour from the breast. However, there are then multiple
differing options as to whether further follow-up treatment
(‘adjuvant therapy’ in medical terms) is administered. There
are several options available in modern medical care, including
drug therapies, radiotherapy and chemotherapy. Recently, the
use of chemotherapy is restricted to only the most serious
and aggressive forms of breast cancer, as the treatment (whilst
potentially very effective) is highly toxic and can cause sig-
nificant side-effects. A clinical protocol for the administration
of chemotherapy is shown in Fig. 8.
This clinical protocol was in use in Nottingham University
Hospitals NHS Trust for many years, and a set of data
consisting of over 1300 women and the decisions made on
administering chemotherapy was made available. The decision
9Fig. 9: Fuzzy rule-base broadly equivalent to the clinical protocol for
advising on chemotherapy (only).
rules embedded within this clinical protocol were implemented
within a fuzzy expert system, focussing solely on the decision
as to whether to administer chemotherapy (i.e. the admin-
istration of other therapies was omitted at this point). The
fuzzy rule set is shown in Fig. 9. The terms (fuzzy sets) in
the input and output variables were derived from expert and
domain knowledge. For example, the NPI variable comprised
four terms, Low, Medium Low, Medium High and High to
correspond to the four main decision categories that can be
observed in the protocol in Fig. 8. The membership functions
of the fuzzy sets were constructed such that there were
crossover points at the boundaries specified in the protocol
— for example the crossover between Low and Medium Low
sets occurred at a value between 3.0 and 3.1.
Having constructed an initial fuzzy expert system based
on this protocol, this system underwent some basic (but
thorough) optimisation, to determine the ‘optimal’ operating
configuration in order to maximise its performance in terms
of agreements against the decisions made in actual clinical
practice [30]. That is, to maximise the agreement between
the fuzzy expert system’s recommendation for administering
chemotherapy (in terms of the Chemo output of the system
being No, Maybe or Yes and the actual advice given to the
real patients (as recorded on the clinical database).
A set of experiments was then carried out to compare this
base type-1 fuzzy expert system against alternative systems
which featured non-stationary fuzzy sets. The experimental
configuration was as follows. In each case, a comparator
system was created which featured non-stationary fuzzy sets
in which the location of the fuzzy sets varied by a fixed
percentage of the universe of discourse (as illustrated in
Fig. 6); this percentage of variation ranged from 1% to 10% of
the universe of discourse (x-axis). The non-stationary system
was run 30 times, in each case obtaining an output of No,
Maybe or Yes. Then a majority vote was used to determine
the final recommendation of the system. The results obtained
are shown in Fig. 10, in which the variation present in the
system is shown on the x-axis and the number of agreements
with clinical practice are shown on the y-axis.
It can be seen from Fig. 10 that the base ‘optimised’
type-1 system achieved 1108 agreements with clinical practice,
which constitutes 84.8% agreement (1108 out of 1306 cases).
In comparison the fuzzy system consisting of non-stationary
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Fig. 10: Performance increase obtained by taking majority vote of an
ensemble of 30 non-stationary fuzzy systems.
fuzzy sets featuring 8% variation (labelled 0.08 on the x-axis),
when run 30 times and a majority vote taken, achieved 1141
agreements (87.4% of the 1306 cases). That is, an ensemble
of 30 non-stationary systems, incorporating variation of 8%,
increased performance compared to an ‘optimised’ system
with no variation.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
The two main cases studies presented in Sec. VII illustrate
two principles: firstly that, using the concept of non-stationary
fuzzy sets, it is possible to model the variation, both inter-
expert and intra-expert variation, observed in human experts
in a decision making context; secondly, that using an en-
semble of systems with variation can improve performance
as compared to a system containing no variation. These case
studies are not claimed to be in any way definitive, nor are
they claimed to prove any benefit of incorporating variation
into computerised expert systems. However, they are used to
illustrate that incorporating some randomness or variation in
some carefully controlled manner may be beneficial. Whilst
the utility of, and indeed the need for, exhibiting variation
in decision making appears absolutely clear and accepted in
the context of adversarial games (is anyone really going to
advocate that Deep Blue or Alpha Go should play each game
exactly the same way in an entirely deterministic manner?),
it has yet to be accepted as a norm in other decision making
contexts. The purpose of this paper is to advocate that further
exploration of this phenomena is required.
It may seem an almost paradoxical claim that varying an
‘optimal’ system can lead to performance increase. The reso-
lution to this apparent paradoxical claim may be through the
understanding that the term ‘optimal’ decision making system
is actually a misnomer. A computerised expert system may be
tuned to give as best performance possible on a given data set,
but of course this does not guarantee the level of performance
that will be achieved on future data (which invariably includes
data that has not been seen previously). In a sense then, any
decision support system, including fuzzy expert system or
world-champion level chess playing program, is forecasting
future actions in the presence of current uncertainty and
imperfect knowledge. Then, the decision (or move for a chess
program) arrived at is a ‘best guess’; and there may (will)
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be error in that best guess. A good analogy is a weather
forecasting system. There are now multiple competing weather
prediction platforms available across connected smart devices.
In each specific instance the vendor of the weather prediction
system aims for their system to be the best possible (loosely
speaking, ‘optimal’). But each is imperfect, and a better
overall prediction can often be obtained by consulting multiple
independent forecasting systems and reaching a consensus
opinion. In this way, a consensus of multiple different opinions
provides a better forecast than any individual ‘optimal’ system.
An interesting observation from Sec. VII-B is that both the
inter- and intra-expert variation was found to be 3% (this is
shorthand for the actual finding that 3% variation in the fuzzy
expert system was found to best model both inter-expert and
intra-expert variation). Considering this further, suppose there
are two experts A and B. Then if each of A and B exhibit
3% intra-expert variation (i.e. each person varies 3% with
themselves) and the inter-expert variation between A and B is
also 3%, then this can only be the case if both A and B
are saying the same thing but with inherent 3% variation.
To understand this, consider the alternative. If both A and
B possess 3% intra-expert variation and A and B are giving
systematically different answers, then the inter-expert variation
would be more than 3%. This remains a conjecture at present;
it requires further investigation for it to become established.
An avenue for speculation that also requires significant
further study is whether quantifying intra-subject variation
may be useful as a proxy measure for actual expertise in
a specific area. Consider as a thought experiment that there
is an expert in a specific specialised subject area (such as
umbilical acid-base analysis) and a novice (the person may
be intelligent, but has no idea how to interpret umbilical acid-
base results). Then we may postulate that the novice will guess
as to the meaning of the results, whereas the expert carefully
interprets them according to the best available knowledge. Is
it not reasonable to suppose that the novice, who is guessing
answers, will have more variation (exhibit a higher level of
intra-expert variation) than the expert? Put another way, if
two people perform a task, one exhibits (say) 1% variation in
doing so, whilst another exhibits 10% variation, which would
be considered better? Of course, it is also possible to imagine a
kind of autistic savant or a person with ‘photographic memory’
who may be able to study a page of numbers (such as in
the umbilical acid-base task), randomly rank them, and then
perform the same task again a week later with perfect recall.
Put another way, possessing low variation does not necessarily
indicate expertise, but exhibiting high variability in a given
task would seem to imply lack of expertise.
As corollary to this, it should also be noted that obtaining
data on intra-subject variation from real people as subjects, and
particularly those considered to be ‘experts’ in a particular
domain, is a difficult and challenging task. It is not hard
to imagine how each of us might feel if approached by a
researcher with the request “please can we measure your
variability so that we may assess whether you are really an
expert?”. In the umbilical acid-base case study, only two of
the original six expert clinicians agreed to take part in the
subsequent study to measure their intra-expert variability; in
the case of the CTG interpretation [26] all 17 experts agreed to
undertake the study twice, enabling calculation of their intra-
expert variability; in both cases, strict conditions of anonymity
were required before the experts agreed to participate. Thus,
whilst this is an area which surely deserves further study, this
is bound to be difficult.
A further observation may be made on interpretability and
explainable AI. It is reasonably straight forward to see how the
clinical protocol encoded in Fig. 8 has been translated into the
fuzzy rule base shown in Fig. 9. Anecdotally, if one shows this
fuzzy rule base to clinicians knowledgeable in breast cancer
prognosis, then they will often simply read the rules and claim
to understand what the fuzzy expert system is doing. Whilst on
one level these rules are understandable — they are written
in linguistic form, are readily readable, and use terms such
as NPI which are commonly understood in the domain —
on another level, the precise influence they have on the fuzzy
inference process is quite unknown. In this way, it may be said
that fuzzy expert systems provide grey box systems, in which
the principles of operation may be understood (or perhaps ap-
preciated) whilst the precise mechanism of operation remains
unclear. However, whilst these precise underlying mechanisms
of operation remain unclear to all apart from a few experts in
fuzzy systems, nevertheless fuzzy systems increase the level
of interpretability or provide a certain level of understanding
which is above that of other inferencing and decision support
systems such as (deep) neural networks. From this perspective,
fuzzy systems have a vital role to play in explainable AI, as
discussed in Sec. II.
A. Variation and Learning
As a final further observation, there is a relationship between
variation and learning, which is important enough to justify
specific emphasis. Whilst the meaning of the word ‘learning’
appears obvious, it is actually quite a difficult concept to define
precisely. Two available standard dictionary definitions are:
“a process which leads to the modification of be-
haviour or the acquisition of new abilities or re-
sponses ” [OED]
“modification of a behavioral tendency by experi-
ence” [Merriam-Webster]
These definitions both share an essential element, which
constitutes a critical component of learning — there must be
some modification of behaviour in order for learning to occur.
In a Pavlovian sense, behaviour consists of certain actions
being taken or responses being shown following an associated
stimulus, usually through some form of sensory input. Put
another way, a behaviour consists of a certain output for a
given input. If the output is fixed for a given input, then
the behaviour remains unchanged. For a process which will
lead to a modification of a behaviour to occur, there must at
some point be a different output for the same given input. That
is, there must be variation in the input-output mapping. If a
system (be it human or computer) always produces the same
output for given input, there cannot be learning.
So, a system must vary its output for the same given input in
order for it (the system) to modify its behaviour. Whilst there
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Fig. 11: If variation in the red fuzzy set leads to a permanent
relocation, as shown by the green set, this will constitute learning.
are several different types of learning (e.g. [31]), a simple
type of reinforcement learning may be as follows. A system
has some behaviour encoded as an input-output mapping. The
system has some random variation in its behaviour, such that
minor variations of behaviour are exhibited from time to time;
different outputs are sometimes produced from the same given
input. If a difference in behaviour leads to an improvement in
outcome, then the input-output mapping may be permanently
changed. In the context of fuzzy expert systems, this may
be modelled through the use of non-stationary fuzzy sets.
Variation of the set around its original generator set is used
to provide variation; if the variation leads to (consistently)
improved performance, then the location of the fuzzy set
permanently alters — the term corresponding to the fuzzy set
would have a new meaning, learned from experience.
This concept can be illustrated by considering the concept
of medium height as represented by the type-1 fuzzy set shown
in Fig. 4. Uncertainty around where the fuzzy set should be
located in shown in Fig. 5, in which the non-stationary fuzzy
sets vary around the specified location. If this variation leads to
a permanent shift in the location of the type-1 generator set, as
shown in Fig. 11, then the fuzzy set representation of medium
height will be permanently moved, and hence a new meaning
of medium height will have been learned. The fundamental
point here is that variation is necessary in order for learning
to take place; it is hard to imagine a system without learning
being deemed to be ‘intelligent’; and, hence, variation is a
critical part of AI.
IX. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Non-stationary fuzzy sets have been used to illustrate one
mechanism though which variation can be included into expert
systems [28], [30]. Whilst these are not necessarily the only
modelling technique available to extend standard type-1 fuzzy
sets, nevertheless it is clear than some such extensions are
required, both for fuzzy systems that incorporate variation,
and for learning fuzzy expert systems. As mentioned earlier,
type-2 fuzzy sets, as originally proposed by Zadeh, provide a
rich mechanism for modelling uncertainty in the membership
functions of fuzzy systems. For a long time, fully general
type-2 fuzzy systems have been difficult to compute with. As
a consequence, much of the work on type-2 sets in the last
twenty years has been with a restricted form of type-2 set
termed interval type-2 fuzzy sets. Whilst useful, and tractable
for the algorithms necessary to create complete fuzzy rule-
based inference, interval type-2 fuzzy sets are insufficient for
modelling the variations in opinion outlined herein.
Recently, research into fully general type-2 fuzzy sets has
been given impetus by the breakthrough in representation in-
troduced by Wagner et al [32], know as ‘zSlices’. These allow
(arbitrarily accurate) approximations of general type-2 systems
to be created, thus opening up the possibilities of progress in
general type-2 fuzzy inferencing systems. But, more work is
required to create accurate and efficient algorithms. There is
also work needed on further exploration of the relationship
between Garibaldi’s non-stationary fuzzy sets and Wagner’s
zSlice-based general type-2 fuzzy sets, to allow these two
important conceptual frameworks to be unified. Some recent
work on constrained type-2 fuzzy sets has made some progress
in this regard [29], [33], but further work is required.
Techniques for incorporating online learning into fuzzy in-
ference systems, as discussed in Sec. VIII-A, perhaps through
the inclusion of reinforcement learning mechanisms with feed-
back loops, are needed to increase the ‘intelligence quotient’ of
fuzzy expert systems. Whilst learning is clearly an important
part of being intelligent, it it hard to reconcile learning with
the evaluation of systems. If intelligent systems are designed
(and allowed or even encouraged) to learn, then of course
this means that there will be modification of their behaviour
over time. How then, will learning (changing) systems be
evaluated as being satisfactory for deployment? Again, though,
following the comments in Sec. IV-B, if humans (which are
clearly learning systems) are allowed to perform tasks, surely
a way must be found to allow computerised learning systems
to perform the same tasks.
Finally, as mentioned in Sec. VII, it is extremely difficult
and time-consuming to obtain reliable observational data on
human variability. This appears to be particularly so in do-
mains of high expertise and in safety critical systems, as it
is here that the notion of variability (and particularly that
of making mistakes) is considered most negatively. As stated
previously, we know that humans make mistakes, even expert
ones, and this does not preclude them operating. However, at
present, it appears to be a quite threatening notion to explicitly
accept such mistakes and to measure them; even in the context
that such information will only be used to improve decision
making, and will not be used as a form of punishment.
It does not appear that society has quite reconciled this
position at present. Consider, for example, driverless cars.
There is much current research in this area, with particular
focus on avoiding accidents, particularly those that lead to
death of pedestrians or other road users. Whilst, of course,
we should minimise risk of injury or death, nevertheless we
allow imperfect human beings to drive, resulting in regular
injury and death. Indeed, according to the World Health
Organization, road traffic accidents caused an estimated 1.25
million deaths worldwide in the year 2010 [34]. Suppose this
staggering number could be reduced one-hundred fold through
the use of driverless cars, thus saving over 1 million lives
per year! Although, over 10,000 people would still be killed,
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surely this overall reduction would justify the introduction of
driverless cars throughout the world. Striving for perfection
(and zero deaths) might unnecessarily delay the radical safety
improvements that this technology could provide.
X. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has made the case firstly for the need for fuzzy
expert systems, as a useful component of a suite of tools
necessary for explainable AI systems, and for the need for
variation to be incorporated within such systems. Whilst deep
learning based neural network systems appear to currently pro-
vide perhaps the highest levels of performance available from
computerised systems at present (in the context of complex
problems requiring AI techniques to solve), they are difficult
to explain. Fuzzy expert systems provide some increased level
of explanation, potentially sufficient to satisfy requirements for
such systems to be able to explain the decisions made.
The argument has also been made that humans (including
‘experts’, whatever that term might mean) rarely, if ever, attain
100% performance — we should not expect computerised
decision support systems to do so, in order for them to be
deployed in practice. Unless we allow computer systems to
make the same mistakes as the best humans, we will delay
the benefits that may be available through their use.
Finally, this paper has made the case that indistinguishability
between a computerised decision support system and the
human experts it seeks to emulate, performed through a form
of evaluation test akin to Turing’s famous Imitation Game
test for AI, should be the test used for allowing deployment
of these systems. We should judge computerised decision
support systems as we judge the best humans they are
intended to support.
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